Yingdi Yu | b56c54e | 2015-05-24 18:47:40 -0700 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | Trust Schema Specification |
| 2 | ========================== |
| 3 | |
| 4 | .. contents:: |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Trust in NDN is based on name. A data packet is valid only if it is signed with a key whose |
| 7 | name satisfies certain conditions (e.g., sharing the same prefix, containing certain name |
| 8 | components, etc.). Such a relation between data name and key name defines a trust rule. Since |
| 9 | keys are just another type of data, authenticating the signing key of a data packet is the same |
| 10 | as authenticating a normal data packet. The trust model of an NDN application consists of a |
| 11 | set of trust rules that associate data with keys, keys with their signing keys (including some |
| 12 | pre-trusted keys). |
| 13 | |
| 14 | Trust schema is a description of a trust model, which can help automate data and interest |
| 15 | packet signing and authentication. A trust schema describes the relationship between packet |
| 16 | and its signing key in terms of name patterns. A trust schema interpreter with the ability to |
| 17 | retrieve public keys (also called *authenticating* *interpreter*) can automatically validate |
| 18 | packets according to the trust model. Similarly, a trust schema interpreter with the ability |
| 19 | to access private keys (also called *signing* *interpreter*) can automatically sign packets |
| 20 | according to the trust model. This specification defines a way to specify a trust model using |
| 21 | the trust schema. |
| 22 | |
| 23 | A trust schema consists of three parts: a list of **rules**, one or more |
| 24 | **anchor**, and a **crypto**: |
| 25 | |
| 26 | .. table:: |
| 27 | |
| 28 | +------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 29 | | **rule** | Restriction on a packet name and its signing key name | |
| 30 | +------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 31 | | **anchor** | A pre-authenticated public key (a data packet carrying the public key) | |
| 32 | +------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 33 | | **crypto** | Cryptographic requirements on packet signature: which public key | |
| 34 | | | algorithm to use, which hashing algorithm to use, and what is the | |
| 35 | | | minimum required signature strength | |
| 36 | +------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 37 | |
| 38 | .. note:: |
| 39 | All values in trust schema definition must be quoted if they contain spaces. |
| 40 | |
| 41 | Here is an example of the schema configuration file: |
| 42 | |
| 43 | :: |
| 44 | |
| 45 | rule |
| 46 | { |
| 47 | id article |
| 48 | name (<>*)<blog><article><><><> |
| 49 | signer author($1) |
| 50 | } |
| 51 | rule |
| 52 | { |
| 53 | id author |
| 54 | name (<>*)<blog><author>[user]<KEY>[id] |
| 55 | signer admin($1) |
| 56 | } |
| 57 | rule |
| 58 | { |
| 59 | id admin |
| 60 | name (<>*)<blog><admin>[user]<KEY>[id] |
| 61 | signer admin($1)|root($1) |
| 62 | } |
| 63 | anchor |
| 64 | { |
| 65 | id root |
| 66 | name (<>*)<blog><KEY>[id] |
| 67 | file blog-root.cert |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | crypto |
| 70 | { |
| 71 | hash sha256 |
| 72 | signing rsa|ecdsa |
| 73 | key-strength 112 |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | |
| 76 | An authenticating interpreter that loads this trust schema can automatically |
| 77 | validate blog articles, blog author keys, and blog admin keys. When an |
| 78 | authenticating interpreter get an article data packet, the interpreter will |
| 79 | find the first **rule** whose **name** matches the data name and check the |
| 80 | data's KeyLocator against the **signer** in the rule. For example, if the |
| 81 | article is signed by an author key which matches the signer **author**, the |
| 82 | interpreter can fetch the key and validate the key using the author rule which |
| 83 | corresponds to the matched signer. The authentication process can recursively |
| 84 | develop until reaching an **anchor**. At this moment, the interpreter can |
| 85 | trigger the signature verification along the reverse path until eventually |
| 86 | authenticating article. |
| 87 | |
| 88 | Similarly, for packet signing, a signing interpreter that loads this trust |
| 89 | schema can construct a chain of signing key to sign packet correctly, so that |
| 90 | the packet can be authenticated by authenticating interpreter using the same |
| 91 | trust schema. |
| 92 | |
| 93 | Rule |
| 94 | ---- |
| 95 | |
| 96 | A rule has the following properties: |
| 97 | |
| 98 | - **id**: a unique identifier of the rule in the trust schema that can be used to |
| 99 | link rules as part of signer "function." The identifier must start with a |
| 100 | letter, and can only contain letters, digits, and underscores. The identifier |
| 101 | is case-sensitive. |
| 102 | |
| 103 | - **name**: name pattern of the packet in terms of :doc:`utils-ndn-regex` |
| 104 | - **type** (optional): type of packet to match against the rule. |
| 105 | |
| 106 | Possible values: **data** (default) and **interest**. |
| 107 | |
| 108 | - **signer**: one or more invocations of rules or trust anchors, separated by **|**. |
| 109 | |
| 110 | Each invocation can take as an input name components that are either explicitly |
| 111 | specified or extracted from the packet name using regular expression sub-groups. |
| 112 | |
| 113 | Output of each rule invocation is a name pattern from the corresponding rule or |
| 114 | trust anchor, specialized with the specified input parameters. |
| 115 | |
| 116 | Example:: |
| 117 | |
| 118 | rule |
| 119 | { |
| 120 | id article |
| 121 | name (<>*)<blog><article><><><> |
| 122 | signer author($1) |
| 123 | } |
| 124 | |
| 125 | |
| 126 | A data/interest packet will be checked by a rule only if the packet **name** |
| 127 | matches the rule's name property. |
| 128 | |
| 129 | For a packet that is matched by a rule, the packet's KeyLocator will be checked |
| 130 | against the rule's **signer** property. |
| 131 | |
| 132 | The packet's KeyLocator must match a name pattern that is derived from at least |
| 133 | one of the signers to be treated as a valid packet. Note that KeyLocator always |
| 134 | points to a certificate, thus the "functions" in a signer must be data rules. |
| 135 | |
| 136 | .. note:: |
| 137 | For interest packets, the name property only matches the name components that |
| 138 | exist before the packet is signed. In other words, if the signature signing |
| 139 | process add the signature info and signature value as name components, these |
| 140 | name components will not be matched by the pattern. |
| 141 | |
| 142 | .. note:: |
| 143 | **ATTENTION: The order of rules MATTERS!** A packet will be check ONLY with |
| 144 | the first matched rule. |
| 145 | |
| 146 | |
| 147 | Anchor |
| 148 | ------ |
| 149 | |
| 150 | A trust schema must contain at least one **anchor** (a pre-authenticated key) and |
| 151 | all authentication paths must end at an anchor. Each anchor must contain: |
| 152 | |
| 153 | - **id**: identifier for the anchor that can be used to link an anchor to a rule |
| 154 | as a signer "function". The identifier must start with a letter, and can only |
| 155 | contain letters, digits, and underscores. The identifier is case-sensitive. |
| 156 | |
| 157 | |
| 158 | - **name**: name pattern of the packet in terms of :doc:`utils-ndn-regex` |
| 159 | |
| 160 | Since an anchor is pre-authenticated, it does not have the **signer** property, |
| 161 | but instead the key directly. Therefore, anchor must specify exactly one of the |
| 162 | following properties: |
| 163 | |
| 164 | - **file**: name of a file containing a base64 encoded pre-authenticated public key |
| 165 | certificate. |
| 166 | |
| 167 | or |
| 168 | |
| 169 | - **raw**: text string in base64 encoding, containing the raw bytes of a pre-authenticated |
| 170 | public key certificate. |
| 171 | |
| 172 | or |
| 173 | |
| 174 | - **dir**: name of directory under which each file contains a base64 encoded |
| 175 | pre-authenticated public key certificate. |
| 176 | |
| 177 | |
| 178 | Examples:: |
| 179 | |
| 180 | anchor |
| 181 | { |
| 182 | id root |
| 183 | name (<>*)<blog><KEY>[id] |
| 184 | file blog-root.cert |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | anchor |
| 187 | { |
| 188 | id another-root |
| 189 | name <KEY>[id] |
| 190 | raw "Bv0DGwdG...amHFvHIMDw==" |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | anchor |
| 193 | { |
| 194 | id root |
| 195 | name (<>*)<blog><KEY>[id] |
| 196 | dir /etc/ndn/trust-anchors |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | |
| 199 | |
| 200 | When **file** or **dir** is specified and the file(s) can change during the runtime, |
| 201 | additional **refresh** property can be specified to define how often the |
| 202 | pre-authenticated key should be refreshed in the trust model (Three units of time |
| 203 | interval are supported: ``h`` for hour, ``m`` for minute, and ``s`` for second):: |
| 204 | |
| 205 | anchor |
| 206 | { |
| 207 | id root |
| 208 | name (<>*)<blog><KEY>[id] |
| 209 | file blog-root.cert |
| 210 | refresh 1h ; refresh the key every hour, other units include |
| 211 | ; m (for minutes) and s (for seconds) |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | |
| 214 | There is another special anchor **any**. As long as such an anchor is defined |
| 215 | in config file, any signature of any data and interest packet is considered valid:: |
| 216 | |
| 217 | anchor |
| 218 | { |
| 219 | any true |
| 220 | } |
| 221 | |
| 222 | .. note:: |
| 223 | |
| 224 | Use of ``any`` anchor is highly discouraged and should only be used to |
| 225 | temporarily disable packet validation (e.g., while debugging code). |
| 226 | |
| 227 | |
| 228 | Crypto (Signature Requirements) |
| 229 | ------------------------------- |
| 230 | |
| 231 | **crypto** block defines the acceptable packet signature. |
| 232 | **crypto** must contain three properties: |
| 233 | |
| 234 | - **hash**: one or more allowed hash algorithms, separated by **|**. |
| 235 | |
| 236 | Possible values: **sha256** |
| 237 | |
| 238 | - **signing**: one or more allowed signing algorithms, separated by **|** |
| 239 | |
| 240 | Possible values: **rsa** (RSA signature algorithm), **ecdsa** (ECDSA signature algorithm) |
| 241 | |
| 242 | - **key-strength**: minimum crypto strength of a key (in terms of symmetric key bits) |
| 243 | |
| 244 | Recommended values by NIST (`details`_) and their equivalent RSA and ECDSA key sizes: |
| 245 | |
| 246 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 247 | | Key Strength (in symmetric key bits) | RSA key bits | ECDSA key bits | |
| 248 | +=============================================+===================+================+ |
| 249 | | 80 (very weak) | 1024 | 160 | |
| 250 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 251 | | 112 (recommended value) | 2048 | 224 | |
| 252 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 253 | | 128 | 3072 | 256 | |
| 254 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 255 | | 192 | 7680 | 384 | |
| 256 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 257 | | 256 (strong) | 15360 | 521 | |
| 258 | +---------------------------------------------+-------------------+----------------+ |
| 259 | |
| 260 | .. todo: define key strengths for RSA 4096 (as it is a pretty commonly used value) |
| 261 | |
| 262 | .. _details: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf |
| 263 | |
| 264 | .. |
| 265 | Any |
| 266 | --- |
| 267 | |
| 268 | There is another special optional property of trust schema **any**. As long as |
| 269 | such a property is specified with a value **true**, packet validation will be |
| 270 | turned off. |
| 271 | |
| 272 | :: |
| 273 | |
| 274 | any true |
| 275 | |
| 276 | .. note:: |
| 277 | **ATTENTION: This property is dangerous.** You should used it only when you |
| 278 | want to disable packet validation temporarily (e.g, debugging code, building |
| 279 | a demo). |
| 280 | |
| 281 | Examples |
| 282 | -------- |
| 283 | |
| 284 | Example Configuration For NLSR |
| 285 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 286 | |
| 287 | The trust model of NLSR is semi-hierarchical. An example certificate signing hierarchy is: |
| 288 | |
| 289 | :: |
| 290 | |
| 291 | root |
| 292 | | |
| 293 | +--------------+---------------+ |
| 294 | site1 site2 |
| 295 | | | |
| 296 | +---------+---------+ + |
| 297 | operator1 operator2 operator3 |
| 298 | | | | |
| 299 | +-----+-----+ +----+-----+ +-----+-----+--------+ |
| 300 | router1 router2 router3 router4 router5 router6 router7 |
| 301 | | | | | | | | |
| 302 | + + + + + + + |
| 303 | NLSR NSLR NSLR NSLR NSLR NSLR NSLR |
| 304 | |
| 305 | However, entities name may not follow the signing hierarchy, for |
| 306 | example: |
| 307 | |
| 308 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 309 | | Entity | Identity name and examples | |
| 310 | +============+=====================================================================================+ |
| 311 | | root | ``/<network>`` | |
| 312 | | | | |
| 313 | | | Identity example: ``/ndn`` | |
| 314 | | | | |
| 315 | | | Certificate name example: ``/ndn/KEY/ksk-1/ID-CERT/%01`` | |
| 316 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 317 | | site | ``/<network>/<site>`` | |
| 318 | | | | |
| 319 | | | Identity example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla`` | |
| 320 | | | | |
| 321 | | | Certificate name example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/KEY/ksk-2/ID-CERT/%01`` | |
| 322 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 323 | | operator | ``/<network>/<site>/%C1.O.N./<operator-id>`` | |
| 324 | | | | |
| 325 | | | Identity example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.N./op1`` | |
| 326 | | | | |
| 327 | | | Certificate name example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.N./op1/KEY/ksk-3/ID-CERT/%01`` | |
| 328 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 329 | | router | ``/<network>/<site>/%C1.O.R./<router-id>`` | |
| 330 | | | | |
| 331 | | | Identity example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.R./rt1`` | |
| 332 | | | | |
| 333 | | | Certificate name example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.R./rt1/KEY/ksk-4/ID-CERT/%01`` | |
| 334 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 335 | | NLSR | ``/<network>/<site>/%C1.O.R./<router-id>/NLSR`` | |
| 336 | | | | |
| 337 | | | Identity example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.R./rt1/NLSR`` | |
| 338 | | | | |
| 339 | | | Certificate name example: ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.R./rt1/NLSR/KEY/ksk-5/ID-CERT/%01`` | |
| 340 | +------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 341 | |
| 342 | Assume that a typical NLSR data name is |
| 343 | ``/ndn/edu/ucla/%C1.O.R./rt1/NLSR/LSA/LSType.1/%01``. Then here is the trust schema: |
| 344 | |
| 345 | :: |
| 346 | |
| 347 | rule |
| 348 | { |
| 349 | id announce |
| 350 | name (<>)(<>*)<%C1.O.R.>(<>)<NLSR><LSA><LSType.1>[id] |
| 351 | signer nlsr($1,$2,$3) |
| 352 | } |
| 353 | rule |
| 354 | { |
| 355 | id nlsr |
| 356 | name (<>)(<>*)<%C1.O.R.>(<>)<NLSR><KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 357 | signer router($1,$2,$3) |
| 358 | } |
| 359 | rule |
| 360 | { |
| 361 | id router |
| 362 | name (<>)(<>*)<%C1.O.R.>(<>)<KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 363 | signer operator($1,$2) |
| 364 | } |
| 365 | rule |
| 366 | { |
| 367 | id operator |
| 368 | name (<>)(<>*)<%C1.O.N.>[user]<KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 369 | signer site($1) |
| 370 | } |
| 371 | rule |
| 372 | { |
| 373 | id site |
| 374 | name (<>)(<>*)<KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 375 | signer root($1) |
| 376 | } |
| 377 | anchor |
| 378 | { |
| 379 | id root |
| 380 | name (<>)<KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 381 | file "testbed-trust-anchor.cert" |
| 382 | } |
| 383 | crypto |
| 384 | { |
| 385 | hash sha-256 |
| 386 | signing rsa|ecdsa |
| 387 | key-strength 112 |
| 388 | } |
| 389 | |
| 390 | Example Configuration For NFD RIB Management |
| 391 | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| 392 | |
| 393 | Assume `NFD RIB Management <http://redmine.named-data.net/projects/nfd/wiki/RibMgmt>`_ |
| 394 | allows any valid testbed certificate to register prefix, the configuration file could be |
| 395 | written as: |
| 396 | |
| 397 | :: |
| 398 | |
| 399 | rule |
| 400 | { |
| 401 | id localhost-rib-command |
| 402 | type interest |
| 403 | name <localhost><nrd>[<register><unregister><advertise><withdraw>]<><prefix>(<>*)(<>) |
| 404 | signer key($1,$2) |
| 405 | } |
| 406 | rule |
| 407 | { |
| 408 | id key |
| 409 | name (<>*)(<>)<KEY>[id]<ID-CERT>[version] |
| 410 | signer key($1,null)|root() |
| 411 | } |
| 412 | trust-anchor |
| 413 | { |
| 414 | id root |
| 415 | name <KEY>[id] |
| 416 | raw "Bv0DGwdG...amHFvHIMDw==" |
| 417 | } |
| 418 | crypto |
| 419 | { |
| 420 | hash sha-256 |
| 421 | signing rsa|ecdsa |
| 422 | key-strength 112 |
| 423 | } |